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Abstract
Some problems in neuroscience are nearly solved. For others, solutions are decades away. The 
current pace of advances in methods forces us to take stock, to ask where we are going, and what 
we should research next.
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Introduction
My lab has a tradition of going to see science fiction movies, followed by beer and 
discussion of their merits. The reactions are instructive, as they partition the films into those 
that are a bit boring because they do not imagine enough, those that are so fantastic that they 
become ungrounded, and (the sweet spot) those that could possibly happen and it would be 
really cool if they did. Although the lines dividing these categories are fuzzy and shift with 
the amount of beer consumed, they reflect what we as scientists ask ourselves all the time: 
What should we do next? What is the most interesting question? What would you propose if 
somebody offered you a billion dollars? The answers, diverse as they may be, cannot simply 
restate facts, nor can they propose sheer fantasy. As with the movies, they need to find the 
most exciting place in between.
An example of this exercise comes from David Hilbert’s famous 23 unsolved problems in 
mathematics. The Wikipedia entry for these conveniently places them into ‘solved’, ‘proven 
to be unsolvable’, ‘ill-posed’, and other categories. Although our counterpart in 
neuroscience cannot provide the same clean distinctions, we can certainly generate lists. As 
for Hilbert’s problems, there is a Wikipedia entry for ‘unsolved problems in neuroscience’; 
there are more popular writings [1]; and there are books [2,3].
In trying to brainstorm a list of my own, I read the above sources and asked around. This 
yields a predictable list ranging from ‘how can we cure psychiatric illness?’ to ‘what is 
consciousness?’ (Box 1). Asking Caltech faculty added entries about how networks function 
and what neural computation is. Caltech students had things figured out and got straight to 
the point (‘how can I sleep less?’, ‘how can we save our species?’, ‘can we become 
immortal?’). Box 2 distills my own idiosyncratic list from all of this (admittedly biased 
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towards cognitive neuroscience). Note that some future questions build on prior ones: we 
need to understand psychiatric illnesses before we can cure them, and whole-brain 
microscopic-resolution imaging of the zebrafish brain (100 000 neurons; done, although 
temporal resolution will improve [4]) needs to come before we do the same for the mouse 
brain (70 000 000 neurons), let alone the human brain (80 000 000 000 neurons).
One way of further narrowing down the questions is to mine what has been written so far in 
the literature to spot relationships, trends, and gaps waiting to be filled. The most 
straightforward case focuses on a specific region of the brain. Doing this shows that the 
thalamus and the insula are most in need of further study, that my favorite structure, the 
amygdala, is already too bloated with studies [5], and that the most popular place to look is 
the pre-supplementary motor cortex [6].
Rethinking methods
Another possible way forward is to focus on methods. Answers usually include words like 
‘resolution’, ‘causal’, and ‘necessary’, but the question of what is the best method is actually 
much more treacherous than one might at first think. Does focal stimulation, no matter how 
specific, cause behavior? Perhaps if it is in motor structures. However, saying that 
stimulation of central structures causes behavior may not be saying much more than saying 
that stimulation of the retina causes behavior: in both cases, much or most of the rest of the 
brain is sandwiched in between what we manipulate and what we measure. If a lesion 
abolishes a behavior, does this mean the lesioned region is necessary for the behavior? Only 
if the rest of the brain stays the same, which it does not. Recovery of function illustrates the 
ubiquity of compensation, and reminds us that the brain is four dimensional. Is more 
microscopic always better? Not if it narrows field-of-view, which it so far always does. 
Even if it did not and we collected complete data about the brain [7], this might be not only 
unnecessary but unhelpful in guiding us towards the right kinds of models to allow further 
explanation. This then brings us to some ‘meta-questions’ that can help to organize the rest.
Meta-question 1: What counts as understanding the brain?
We want more than mere description, even more than prediction. So all the data in the 
world, by themselves, would surely not fit the bill. We need to make sense of them in some 
way, and the questions in Box 2 attempt to flesh out what this would entail. There is one 
important additional ingredient: unlike for other difficult domains of inquiry, we seem to 
have prior expectations about the form the answers might take. Folk psychology, our 
intuitive understanding of our own minds and the minds of others, places some strong 
(although perhaps not immutable) constraints on what could count as an adequate answer. 
That is why there is so little agreement, for example, on theories of consciousness – people 
have strong prior requirements on the answers, and what counts as an explanation for one 
person is missing the point for another.
Meta-question 2: How can a brain be built?
Some argue that we can only understand the brain once we know how it could be built. Both 
evolution and development describe temporally sequenced processes whose final expression 
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looks very complex indeed, but the underlying generative rules may be relatively simple (for 
an interesting approach to discovering these rules, see [8]). Perhaps knowing how to build a 
brain will enable us to glean general principles that cut across the many individual questions, 
and across species. Or might there instead be a huge diversity of specialized and baroque 
mechanisms, a giant ‘bag of tricks’, that serves each organism very well for specific 
problems in its niche, but that share no illuminating larger themes? Probably there are both 
general principles as well as specific constraints and local solutions, and an engineering 
view would force us to map this out. There is also the hope that understanding how 
evolution or engineering could build a brain would help us understand what problems brains 
are designed to solve: what is their proper function?
Meta-question 3: What are the different ways of understanding the brain?
Here we could look to the framework proposed by David Marr [9], which asks three further 
types of questions. First, what is the function (of memory, of vision, of consciousness, of the 
brain)? Second, what are the algorithms that achieve this function (how can it be described 
with computational models)? And third, how is this implemented in the brain (how can 
neurobiologists measure it)? The implementation level reveals further levels, this time of 
resolution: there is implementation at the level of synapses, neurons, circuits, systems, and 
brains. Marr’s functional level (what he termed, somewhat confusingly, the ‘computational 
level’) can yield reasonable initial answers for specific systems: vision is to know what is 
where by looking; audition is to know what is where by listening; memory may be the 
ability to predict the future by learning. Harder nuts to crack are functional criteria for 
consciousness or cognition, and we probably have to decompose these. A further in-sight is 
that just as the implementation level is multi-resolution, so is the functional level. We can 
describe the function in terms of sensory inputs to, and behavioral outputs from, the 
organism. However, we could also de-scribe the function of any internal component of the 
brain in terms of how it transforms inputs to outputs among its immediate connections with 
other brain structures. It remains an open question how well this works, but some degree of 
such functional decomposition must be possible if we are to understand the brain at all.
Focus on algorithms
All three levels are essential, but in my view the most important may be the algorithmic. 
What computations describe how neural processes implement particular functions? 
Computations are implemented in both analog and spiking information processing that 
happens in structures ranging from the complex geometry of dendritic trees, to the dynamic 
large-scale networks that are distributed across the brain. A large range of analogies has 
been summoned to describe the way in which the brain computes: classical computers, 
dynamical systems, and the syntax of language, to name only a few. Thinking, cognition, 
reasoning, computation, central states, and information processing are all somehow related, 
but often studied from quite different approaches. All of this is important because there is 
reason to believe that brains compute not just in the sense that we could model their function 
computationally (as we could model the weather), but in the sense that this may be the 
proper function of nervous systems. (Which is not to say that computation is a function 
unique to nervous systems).
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Concluding remarks
In a nutshell, then, the biggest unsolved problem is how the brain generates the mind, 
conceived of in a way that does not simultaneously require answering the problem of 
consciousness (Box 1). We can perfectly well ask about cognition and computation without 
asking about subjective experience – although one would hope that a full understanding of 
the first two might eventually explain the third. Indeed, a mark of success in understanding 
how brains compute should be that this would provide us with answers to all the related 
questions (what is cognition? what is psychology?). This is of course a very tall order. The 
only plausible approach, in my view, is to make comparisons, across species and across 
levels. We cannot understand how we reason and think until we understand cognition 
broadly across species; and we cannot understand that unless we understand relations 
between all the levels that describe what a brain does. Nobody said this would be easy.
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Box 1
Consciousness, easy and hard
A perennial entry on any list of unanswered questions, consciousness fractionates into 
multiple problems. Some have seen so much advance that they fall into the ‘solved/soon 
solved’ category: the psychophysics of conscious experiences, and aspects of what 
neurological factors globally distinguish the state of being conscious from being 
unconscious. Then there are two ‘hard’ questions of consciousness, one methodological 
and the other conceptual. Methodologically, it is very hard to see how the neural 
correlates of a conscious experience can be separated from everything that accompanies 
such a conscious experience (our own access to it required for reporting it, antecedent 
events that make the experience possible, and other events that blur into constitutive 
components of consciousness) [10]. Conceptually, it remains hard for us to understand 
why neuronal events, even if we were able uniquely to isolate them, should give rise to a 
particular conscious experience, or indeed to any conscious experience at all [11]. These 
difficulties notwithstanding, there are intriguing suggestions that we could at least 
compare the neural correlates of experiences among different people and thus begin to 
map out individual similarities and differences [12], perhaps even extending this to 
comparisons with nonhuman primates [13].
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Box 2
The unsolved problems of neuroscience
Problems that are solved, or soon will be:
I How do single neurons compute?
II What is the connectome of a small nervous system, like that of Caenorhabitis 
elegans (300 neurons)?
III How can we image a live brain of 100 000 neurons at cellular and 
millisecond resolution?
IV How does sensory transduction work?
Problems that we should be able to solve in the next 50 years:
V How do circuits of neurons compute?
VI What is the complete connectome of the mouse brain (70 000 000 neurons)?
VII How can we image a live mouse brain at cellular and millisecond resolution?
VIII What causes psychiatric and neurological illness?
IX How do learning and memory work?
X Why do we sleep and dream?
XI How do we make decisions?
XII How does the brain represent abstract ideas?
Problems that we should be able to solve, but who knows when:
XIII How does the mouse brain compute?
XIV What is the complete connectome of the human brain (80 000 000 000 
neurons)?
XV How can we image a live human brain at cellular and millisecond resolution?
XVI How could we cure psychiatric and neurological diseases?
XVII How could we make everybody’s brain function best?
Problems we may never solve:
XVIII How does the human brain compute?
XIX How can cognition be so flexible and generative?
XX How and why does conscious experience arise?
Meta-questions:
XXI What counts as an explanation of how the brain works? (and which 
disciplines would be needed to provide it?)
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XXII How could we build a brain? (how do evolution and development do it?)
XXIII What are the different ways of understanding the brain? (what is function, 
algorithm, implementation?)
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